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DAMAGES
A. Evidence of Damages
In Nelson v. Coleman Co.1 the court confronted the question
of the competency of the evidence used to prove damages. The
plaintiff was seeking to recover for the destruction of his
house and personalty allegedly caused by the negligence of
the defendant in the manufacture of a furnace. The plaintiff
sought to prove his damages by listing each item destroyed
and its value. The list put the value of the destroyed property
at $11,193.20, and the jury returned a verdict of $8,375.00.
The defendant objected to the introduction of the list, alleging
that it was hearsay because the plaintiff's wife had helped
compile the list, but had not testified with respect to its ac-
curacy. The defendant reasoned that the testimony was
hearsay because the husband was testifying as to the value
that the wife had placed on the different items. The supreme
court affirmed the lower court holding that the list was
admissible. In Howell v. State Highway Department2 the
court had held that a landowner could give his estimate of the
amount of damage that he had sustained when the highway
department took part of his land to widen a road in front
of his house. The Nelson court found an analogy between the
Howell case and the present factual situation. In Howell the
plaintiff had been allowed to state the value of the land. In
Nelson, therefore, the statement by the husband with respect
to the value was sufficient and the list did not have to be
verified by the wife. The court, citing American Jurisprud-
ence," further held that the value to be placed on the destroyed
items was the value to the owner, absent any fanciful or in-
flated value, and was not limited to its actual replacement
value or its secondhand value.
In Gause v. Livingston4 the court held as prejudicial error
the testimony that the father of the minor plaintiff had been
blind for 25 years and that the mother was the sole supporter
of six children. This testimony had no relevancy to the issue
of damages suffered by the minor plaintiff. This was not
1. 249 S.C. 652, 155 S.E.2d 917 (1967).
2. 167 S.C. 217, 166 S.E. 129 (1932).
3. 22 Am. JuR. 2d Damages § 150 (1965).
4. 159 S.E.2d 604 (S.C. 1968).
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a suit to recover for the loss of the daughter's services, in
which case the evidence might be relevant to show the value of
these services. The authorities also appear divided with re-
spect to whether the same testimony would be admissible if
the father had been the plaintiff and had also been blind.5
B. Computing Pecuniary and Compensatory Damages
Two federal cases decided during the survey period dealt
with "work life expectancy," an area apparently of novel im-
pression in South Carolina. In Ray v. United States the
district court defined "work life expectancy" as the same
as the person's life expectancy. The defendant contended that
the plaintiff could not be expected to work beyond the age of
62, the Social Security retirement age. The defendant also
relied on the fact that most workers at the factory retired
at the age of 65. The court refused to consider this evidence.
In interpreting the South Carolina statute establishing the
mortuary table and authorizing its use,7 the court stated:
By the language of the statute, this court is guided
to the conclusion that the legislature did not, does
not, intend that either social security benefit ages,
retirement ages, or other collateral assumptions or
calculations should be written into the formula used.8
The court cited Cuneo v. Philadelphia Transportation Co.9
in support of its proposition that the Social Security retire-
ment ages should not be taken into consideration and Clifford
v. Southern Railway0 as holding "that a jury may find what
a person is capable of earning in a year and then find out
what their earning capacity would be for a lifetime."'" The
Clifford case, however, added that the "jury is to exercise
a great amount of common sense . . . as for instance, it is
5. See 22 AM. JuR. 2d Damages § 318 (1965).
6. 277 F. Supp. 952 (D.S.C. 1968).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-12 (Supp. 1967). The applicable code section
reads as follows:
When it is necessary, in any civil action or other mode of litiga-
tion, to establish the life expectancy of any person from any
period in his life, whether he be living at the time or not, the
table below shall be received in all courts and by all persons hav-
ing power to determine litigation as evidence (along with other
evidence as to his health, constitution and habits) of the life ex-
pectancy of such person.
8. 277 F. Supp. at 954 (emphasis added).
9. 405 Pa. 532, 176 A.2d 896 (1961).
10. 87 S.C. 324, 69 S.E. 513 (1910).
11. 277 F. Supp. at 954.
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a matter of human experience that as a person grows older
their earning capacity decreases."' 2 In this respect the court
in Ray followed the Clifford decision precisely. In fact, the
court determined that the plaintiff would earn a normal
wage until age 65 and made the collateral assumption that
the plaintiff would earn a more limited salary until the
age 70.18
In Brooks v. United States,14 decided prior to the Ray case,
the district court was also confronted with a question of work
life expectancy. Unlike the novel treatment which was later
given this question in Ray, in Brooks the court dealt with the
issue summarily.
The plaintiff brought both wrongful death and survival
actions. The decedent was 33 years old at the time of his
death and had a life expectancy of 38 years. The court
recognized that persons employed in the plaintiff's capacity
normally retired at age 68. Based on this fact, the court
held that his work life expectancy would end at age 68,
three years before his life expectancy would have ended. The
court stated that "it is the probable duration of the plain-
tiff's earning capacity - his 'work expectancy' - over
which the estimate of prospective annual earnings must be
spread and not his life expectancy."' 15 The Brooks court,
therefore, obviously used "other collateral assumptions or
calculations" which the court in Ray allegedly refused to con-
sider.
The only conclusion that can be reached from a reading
of the two cases is that Social Security retirement ages alone
will not be a factor in limiting work life expectancy, but if
the employer normally retires personnel at a certain age, this
factor may be used.
The major question decided by Brooks was the allowance of
a deduction for future income taxes from estimated future
earnings. The Ray court, however, in reaching the same re-
sult gave this question of apparent novel impression only
summary treatment. The Brooks court, arguing that future
income taxes were not too speculative, stated:
12. 87 S.C. at 330, 69 S.E. at 515.
13. 277 F. Supp. at 955.
14. 273 F. Supp. 619 (D.S.C. 1967).
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[A]ssuredly, the incidence of future income taxes is
no more "guess work" and no more difficult of exact
calculation than possible future advancement, wage
increases and inflation, all matters to be taken into
account in calculating future income. Nor is it to be
forgotten that mathematical precision in fixing dam-
ages is not demanded.' 6
Indeed, it is strange for the law to say that a 33 year old
man will live exactly 38 more years, but not deduct a single
cent for future income taxes because it is too speculative.
These cases, however, put South Carolina in the minority
position on this question.
1'
The court recognized that many cases denying a deduction
for future income taxes were cases involving personal injury.
Other factors, moreover, were present in these injury cases
that were not present in a death case. The Brooks court,
therefore, left open the question of whether to allow a de-
duction for future income taxes in personal injury cases.
The Ray case, however, involved a personal injury and a
deduction was allowed for future income taxes. On the facts
in the Ray case, therefore, the question left open by Brooks
has been decided.
C. Admissibility of a Covenant not to Sue
In Powers v. Temple' the South Carolina Supreme Court,
facing a novel issue, held that a covenant not to sue and
the consideration paid therefor could not be admitted into
evidence before the jury. The plaintiff, after the defendant
in the present action had answered, gave a covenant not to
sue to the other joint tortfeasor for a consideration of $6,500.
The present defendant was allowed to amend his answer so
as to plead the execution of the covenant. The court, noting
that there was practically no dispute among the states as
to the fact that such credit should be allowed, stated:
There is considerable conflict, however, as to the
proper manner of allowing such credit, that is,
whether the credit should be allowed by the jury in
16. Id.
17. See Annot., 63 A.L.R.2d 1393 (1959).
18. 250 S.C. 149, 156 S.E.2d 759 (1967). For a full discussion of this
case see 19 S.C.L. REV. 896 (1967).
1968]
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assessing the injured party's damages, or by the
court. We are convinced from a study of these au-
thorities that the sounder and preferable method,
at least where there are no fact questions concerning
the covenant for the determination of the jury, is
for evidence thereabout to be excluded from the con-
sideration of the jury, and for credit to be given by
the court.19
The admission of the covenant not to sue was held error
although the jury had been instructed to deduct from the
verdict the amount of the consideration given for the cove-
nant. The error, however, was held not to be prejudicial to
the plaintiff.
Powers demonstrated the dispute with respect to the method
by which the credit should be allowed - by the judge or
by the jury. There is also dispute over who is prejudiced
by admitting the evidence concerning the covenant.20 Plain-
tiffs argue that to admit the covenant would give the jury
the impression that the other defendant was the negligent
party. Defendants generally argue that there is no way to
ascertain if the jury allowed the credit and therefore the
judgment is higher than it legally should be. In South Caro-
lina, it is now settled that a covenant not to sue is not to be
admitted into evidence and the credit is to be allowed by the
judge.
Another issue decided in the Powers case was that it is
prejudicial to require the plaintiff to admit that she received
her salary while she was recovering from her injuries. While
this precise question on the collateral source rule had not
previously been decided in South Carolina, several cases bear-
ing a strong analogy to the present case lend strong support
to the court's decision. 21
19. Id. at 155, 156 S.E.2d at 761. For a general discussion of this area
see Annot., 94 A.L.R.2d 352 (1964).
20. See, e.g., Husky Refining Co. v. Barnes, 119 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1941)
(defendant appealed when jury verdict did not affirmatively show that the
jury had allowed the deduction); Steele v. Hash, 212 Cal. App. 2d 1, 27
Cal. Rptr. 853 (1963) (plaintiff appealed from alleged error in admitting
the covenant into evidence).
21. Scott v. Southern Ry., 231 S.C. 28, 97 S.E.2d 73 (1957) (rental
value of car was recoverable even though car was furnished gratuitously);
Joiner v. Fort, 226 S.C. 249, 84 S.E.2d 719 (1954) (evidence that hospital
expenses had been paid by an insurance company properly excluded) ; Jef-
fords v. Florence County, 165 S.C. 15, 162 S.E. 574 (1932) (evidence that
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D. Miscellaneous
In Middlebrook v. Curtis Publishing Co.,22 an invasion of
the right of privacy case, the court stated as a matter of
dictum that South Carolina does recognize the invasion of
the right of privacy as a tort and that the establishment
of malice would justify punitive as well as actual damages.
Concerning adequacy of awards, Jones v. Hamm 23 held
that $7,500 was not excessive for a 39 year old school teacher
when she suffered from severe headaches, back pains and
nervousness. There was also medical testimony that she would
continue to suffer pain and discomfort.
Ray v. United States24 held that $12,000 for loss of future
earnings for a 58 year old woman making $60.80 per week
for the period from age 62 until the end of her life expectancy
at age 75 was adequate. For the period from her present
age, 58, until age 62, $9,062.00 was held adequate. The court
also awarded $9,500 for pain and suffering, present and
future, and $10,000 for disfigurement.
Brooks v. United States25 awarded $3,500 for approximately
one hour and fifteen minutes of pain and suffering, $45,000
for loss of companionship, and $20,000 for mental shock and
suffering. These awards were in addition to loss of future
wages and pension.
C. RAUCH WISE
22. 281 F. Supp. 1 (D.S.C. 1968).
28. 283 F. Supp. 199 (D.S.C. 1967), affd per curiam, 392 F.2d 193
(4th Cir. 1968).
24. 277 F. Supp. at 955.
25. 273 F. Supp. 619 (D.S.C. 1967).
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